Abstract: Passage of the Project BioShield Act of 2004 evinced an executive and legislative desire to increase government-controlled laboratory space dedicated to studying dangerous pathogens. Pursuant to this Act, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) awarded generous construction grants to research universities nationwide. Unsurprisingly, siting disputes have subsequently arisen over the placement of several of these proposed laboratories in densely populated areas. Because NIH chose not to complete a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), the potential litigation endgames are suboptimal. This fuels a larger debate over the relevance of PEISs in general in light of their recognized value but sporadic invocation. This Note uses a game theory model to argue that initial completion of a thorough PEIS would have led NIH to propose laboratories in areas with comparatively lower population densities. This preferable but currently unattainable outcome demonstrates the need for reform. To that end, this Note concludes with recommendations for legislative, executive, and judicial modernization of PEISs.
The primary hazards to personnel working with Biosafety Level 4 agents are respiratory exposure to infectious aerosols, mucous membrane or broken skin exposure to infectious droplets, and autoinoculation. All manipulations of potentially infectious diagnostic materials, isolates, and naturally or experimentally infected animals, pose a high risk of exposure and infection to laboratory personnel, the community, and the environment. 1
In September 2003, Boston University Medical Center (BUMC) received $120 million toward the construction and operation of a BSL-3/4 research facility, after being selected as one of nine institutions to be awarded generous federal grants under Project BioShield.7 Many local politicians supported the proposed project,8 based partly on the government's assurance that the risk involved is "negligible."9
Despite this self-serving administrative assurance, recent media coverage has documented numerous scenarios involving non-negligible amounts of risk at existing BSL-3/4 laboratories, including: the potential spread of pathogens due to power loss;10 the release of pathogens inside a laboratory;11 the misplacement of pathogens;12 the release of pathogens during transit;13 and the accidental transmission of pathogens to laboratory workers.14 One can easily conceive of a disaster scenario in downtown Boston rivaling or surpassing the 2002 SARS epidemic in Southeast Asia.15 This Note does not take the radical view that accidents of this nature are certain to occur if the proposed BUMC laboratory is built; rather, it assumes that the siting of a BSL-3/4 labora-3/4 organisms, stating: "It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known." 9 See BUMC DEIS, supra note 4, at 4-6 to 4-14; see also discussion infra Part V.B. tory in such a densely populated area would, contrary to the government's assertion, necessarily constitute some nontrivial amount of risk. 16 Two local groups-Alternatives for Community & Environment (ACE)17 and Safety Net18-share this assumption, including it among their claims in various response letters written during public comment periods throughout the federal and state environmental review 16 See Alternatives for Cmty. & Env't/Safety Net, Which One Does Not Belong? (Mar. 12, 2004) , http://www.ace-ej.org/BiolabWeb/Biolabdocs/WhichOneDoesNotBelong3-12-04.pdf. Statistics compiled by a community environmental group cite the local population density for the proposed BUMC laboratory as being more than four times higher than that of any of the four BSL-4 laboratories already in existence. See id.
Where many are familiar with Love Canal, Three-Mile Island, and the Exxon-Valdez oil spill, the government's contention that no meaningful risks would be posed by the transportation and study of Ebola and SARS viruses in a densely populated, urban neighborhood rings hollow. Moreover, documents and regulations exist which belie the executive branch's professed view on the innocuousness of BSL-3/4 laboratories. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 73.17 (2005) (tacitly recognizing the possibility of the "theft, loss, or release," of a selected agent or toxin by listing agencies' notiªcation requirements in such scenarios); Ofªce of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Summary Report on Select Agent Security at Universities 1-3 (Mar. 2004) (documenting "serious weaknesses" at all eleven universities studied in preventing unauthorized entry and removal of infectious substances from university "hot labs"), available at http://org.hhs. gov/oas/reports/region4/40402000.pdf.
17 ACE, based in Roxbury, Massachusetts, "works in partnership with low income communities and communities of color to achieve environmental justice. EPA deªnes environmental justice as "the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies." EPA, Environmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/environmentaljustice/ index.html (last visited May 4, 2006). The environmental justice movement has gained recognition over the last few decades as it has become apparent to many that communities with higher percentages of minority and low-income populations are often asked to bear disproportionate numbers of locally unwanted land uses (LULUs). See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 787, 796-806 (1993) ; Lawrence E. Susskind, A Negotiation Credo for Controversial Siting Disputes, 6 Negotiation J. 309, 309-10 (1990) . Importantly, LULUs such as nuclear power plants and toxic waste dumps are often associated with heightened levels of environmental and health risk. See Daniel C. Wigley & Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Environmental Racism and Biased Methods of Risk Assessment, 7 RISK 55, 57 (1996) .
18 Safety Net describes itself as being "comprised of public housing residents and others in Roxbury who came together in 2000 to develop a voice and vision for a sustainable Roxbury and equitable metropolitan development." December ACE Letter, supra note 17, at 1. Because the proposed BSL-3/4 laboratory will be "located near their densely populated urban neighborhood," members of Safety Net believe that it "will have adverse environmental, health, safety, and economic impacts." Id. processes.19 As of the date of publication, these groups were involved in an ongoing lawsuit challenging the ªnal state environmental certiªcation.20 This Note foregoes analysis of the local matters and focuses instead on the legal challenges surrounding the federal environmental certiªcation once it becomes ªnal, because these ªndings will be more relevant to other proposed laboratory sites.21 In addition, if the state litigation were to block the proposed BUMC BSL-3/4 laboratory, the analysis in this Note will remain relevant should the federal government choose to redirect its muniªcence.
While the local groups' missives offer a potential road map for future Project BioShield litigation, they also raise pertinent questions about the future of environmental review in general. In particular, one of the environmental plaintiffs' central claims-that the government failed to complete a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS)22 for Project BioShield as a whole before choosing speciªc locations for the proposed BSL-3/4 laboratories23-is a frequent point of contention in environmental litigation.24 Indeed, uncertain- 21 For a list of these proposed laboratory sites, see infra note 42. 22 One of the foremost authorities on environmental litigation describes PEISs-also known as "program," "cumulative," and "comprehensive" EIS's-as follows:
Cases arise in which an impact statement on a group of related actions or an agency program that may lead to later individual actions, may be helpful. The impact statement that is prepared in situations of this kind is known as a program environmental impact statement (PEIS). . . . Often it is difªcult to examine the cumulative impact of a number of individual but related actions when they are reviewed one at a time. The [PEIS] can help overcome this problem by considering a group of related actions together or by reviewing the implications of an agency's program comprehensively before it produces actions that will be reviewed individually. This Note supports the need for PEIS modernization; the predictions made herein regarding the impending Project BioShield litigation also bolster the need for this Note's proffered remedies. Part I details the recent political events leading up to the present controversy. Part II establishes the foundation for the plaintiffs' "Failure to Complete a PEIS" claim by discussing the statutory and regulatory foundation behind PEISs, as well as related case law from the past three decades. Part III examines two relevant branches of plaintiffs' "Inadequate EIS" claim: failure to adequately consider project alternatives, and inadequate risk-assessment methodologies.
In an effort to catalog probable litigation outcomes, Parts IV and V analyze the backgrounds from Parts II and III, respectively, as they apply to Project BioShield litigation. While Part IV concludes that a court reviewing the siting of any of the proposed laboratories is not likely at this point to mandate a PEIS for Project BioShield, Part V examines the potential Boston litigation speciªcally and concludes that a reviewing court may indeed invalidate the BUMC EIS, either for inadequate consideration of project alternatives or inadequate riskassessment methodologies.
Part VI applies the litigation predictions from Parts IV and V to a well-known game theory model entitled the prisoner's dilemma. This model demonstrates that the optimal outcome would have required agency completion of a thorough PEIS at Project BioShield's inception. Since the panacea of agency-environmentalist cooperation is shown to be realistically unattainable, this Part concludes that Congress, the executive appointee in charge of promulgating environmental regulations, and the courts should nonetheless strive for the best possible outcome by attempting to force concessions from both sides.
Finally provement from any individual branch would require overcoming the powerful inertia of the status quo, clarifying regulations from the executive branch would have the most welcome effect on agencies' PEIS interpretations. This Part argues that such interpretive regulations are unlikely to be forthcoming in the absence of sincere judicial censure of agencies' current EIS shortcomings and PEIS reticence. As the prisoner's dilemma analysis demonstrates, Project BioShield litigation presents the judiciary with just such an opportunity.
I. Setting the Stage for Litigation
In order to prepare the United States for a potential bioterrorism attack, President George W. Bush has authorized a major funding initiative intended to increase the amount of research space dedicated to the study of potential bioterrorism agents.26 Due to the inherently dangerous nature of the bioterrorism agents, local siting disputes have arisen at several of the newly proposed laboratories.27
A. Project BioShield and the Push for More BSL-3/4 Space
President Bush ªrst mentioned Project BioShield during his January 2003 State of the Union Address.28 Shortly thereafter, details of the plan revealed that Project BioShield would consist of $6 billion in funding, a large part of which would be allocated for "research and development on bioterrorism threat agents."29 Eighteen months later President Bush signed into law the Project BioShield Act,30 stating, "Our goal is to translate today's promising medical research into drugs and vaccines to combat a biological attack in the future-and now we will not let bureaucratic obstacles stand in the way."31
As a result of the President's initiative, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has seen its prominence-and its funding-increase At that time, the legislative talk of a "comprehensive national [environmental] policy"53 was in part a reference to the scope of review that government agencies were henceforth required to conduct upon the proposal of any "major Federal actions signiªcantly affecting the quality of the human environment."54 This broad review-known as an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)-is a "detailed" report on, inter alia, "the environmental impact of the proposed action."55 Although an EIS must be detailed, the language of NEPA itself remains purposefully vague, reºecting the legislators' intent to replace what had been a piecemeal approach among the agencies towards environmental planning with a more "rationalized, comprehensive system."56 NEPA's broad language does not speciªcally mention PEISs, leaving the interpretation of its provisions to the appropriate regulatory authority.57 Importantly, the federal government is directed to "use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy" in exercising their discretion with respect to environmental decisions.58
B. Regulatory Authority: CEQ's PEIS Recommendations
CEQ was created by NEPA in 1969 and was charged with reviewing, investigating, and reporting back to the President on environmental issues.59 Due to early confusion over how much weight agencies were required to give CEQ's guidelines, President Carter issued an Executive Order in 1977 empowering CEQ to interpret NEPA's procedural provisions and issue its ªndings as regulations.60 These regulations became binding upon all federal agencies in November 1979, and have been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to be entitled to "substantial deference."61
The CEQ regulations make numerous positive references to the overarching policy theory behind PEISs: if disparate federal actions are sufªciently related, a broad PEIS should be conducted if it will serve to "avoid duplication and delay" in the longrun.62 Echoing NEPA's statutory language, the regulations list "systematic and connected agency decisions allocating agency resources to implement a speciªc statutory program or executive directive" as a recognized "Federal action[]."63 Once this threshold has been met, the regulations further state that an EIS "may be prepared, and [is] sometimes required" for the project as a whole64-the very deªnition of a PEIS.
When preparing statements on these expansive actions, agencies are encouraged to consider preparing a PEIS for proposals which have "common timing, impacts, alternatives, methods of implementation, media, or subject matter."65 Similarly, and perhaps more relevant to Project BioShield, a PEIS on federal proposals that are at the same "stage of technological development including federal or federally assisted research . . . for new technologies" may be required "before the program has reached a stage of investment or commitment to implementation likely to determine subsequent development or restrict later alternatives."66 Lastly, CEQ regulations devote a subsection to the deªnition of "tiering": the discretionary process by which an agency may choose to ªle a PEIS discussing broad program objectives before following up with site-speciªc EISs referencing the general ªndings.67 C. Case Law NEPA is aptly described as a statute more concerned with looking at the forest than the trees. In spite of-or perhaps because of-its broad language and purpose, NEPA's legislative history has often likely "bear little resemblance" to site-speciªc local EISs,77 they would be valid in either case since the "bounds of the analysis are deªned."78 Moreover, the Kleppe Court ruled that NEPA's "action forcing" EIS obligation "may require a [PEIS] in certain situations where several proposed actions are pending at the same time."79 In the words of Justice Powell, "[W]hen several proposals for . . . actions that will have cumulative or synergistic environmental impact . . . are pending concurrently before an agency, their environmental consequences must be considered together."80 The Court cited the statute's lofty policy objectives in determining Congress's original intention to require "'all agencies to assure consideration of the environmental impact of their actions in decisionmaking.'"81
Reconciling Kleppe with a Deferential Standard of Review
Though Kleppe is still good law after thirty years, the Court's ªnd-ing that a PEIS is required in certain circumstances has proven difªcult to implement in lower courts.82 This is due in large part to the deferential "arbitrary or capricious" standard of review for agency actions.83 Indeed, in Kleppe itself, the Court stated that, for a plaintiff to prevail on a charge of failure to complete a PEIS, she "must show that [ action" with a national scope, and therefore required preparation of a PEIS.87 After stating its adherence to the Supreme Court's ruling, however, the lower court refused to impose its stated "requirement."88 Citing the fact that the agency had previously decided to prepare sitespeciªc EISs, the court held that "there would be little sense in requiring an impact statement at the planning stage which would cover the same ground."89 Thus, despite ruling that a PEIS was required under Kleppe, the court deferred to the agency's decision not to prepare one.90
In Churchill County v. Norton, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reafªrmed the Adams holding nearly a quarter-century later.91 In holding that there is little courts can do if agencies do not act arbitrarilyeven when a court ªnds a PEIS to be the preferred method of analysis-the Ninth Circuit stated:
The regulations and case law would support a decision by the [defendant agency] to prepare a programmatic EIS, had it decided to prepare one. Indeed, had we been charged with the decision, we may have elected to prepare a programmatic EIS ªrst. The problem, of course, is that it was not our decision to make.92 There, as in the instant dispute, plaintiffs challenged an NIH decision not to produce a PEIS for an action taken in the name of public health: the planned release of a genetically engineered bacteria into the environment.112 The court stated that the potential for environmental damage was a "'low probability, high consequence risk; that is, while there is only a small possibility that damage could occur, the damage that could occur is great. ' The second major NEPA claim in environmental groups' comment letters on Project BioShield is that NIH's site-speciªc EIS, as completed, is inadequate.127 Because EISs are complex documents with various mandated components, a claim of this nature can fault a number of distinct aspects of an EIS.128 The two aspects of PEIS inadequacy most relevant to this Note's discussion are: (1) failure to adequately consider alternative locations; and (2) inadequate risk-assessment methodologies.
A. Failure to Adequately Consider Project Alternatives
In what the CEQ regulations characterize as the "heart" of an EIS,129 NEPA requires all federal agencies to consider possible alternatives to their proposed actions in an EIS. 130 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii), (2)(E). Though these NEPA subsections have slightly different approaches-subsection (2)(C)(iii) contains broader language than sub-take two different forms-referred to as primary and secondary alternatives-between which courts do not discriminate when evaluating the adequacy of an EIS.131 NEPA requires agencies to consider these project alternatives in order to "insure the integrated use of . . . the environmental design arts in planning and decisionmaking."132 A CEQ regulation codiªes the "rule of reason" set forth in a leading circuit court decision,133 stating that agencies are to "[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives, and for alternatives which were eliminated from detailed study, brieºy discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated."134 In addition, agencies must "[d]evote substantial treatment to each alternative considered in detail including the proposed action so that reviewers may evaluate their comparative merits."135 Importantly, agencies must state an underlying "purpose and need" to which they are responding when discussing proposed alternatives.136 The narrowness of these stated rationales can potentially limit the alternatives that an agency is required to take into account.137 Agencies have been criticized for intentionally propounding narrow project purposes,138 and two Circuit Courts of Appeals have section (2)(E)-courts regularly see these two subsections as interchangeable. See Mandelker, supra note 22, § 9:18.
131 See generally Mandelker, supra note 22, § § 10:31, 10:32. A primary alternative is "a substitute for the agency's proposed action that accomplishes the action in another manner," while a secondary alternative is "a means of carrying out a proposed action in a different manner." Id.
132 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A). These alternatives must be analyzed and considered before agency decisions are made. The Second Circuit recognized as much shortly after NEPA's inception, stating, "[T]he critical agency decision must, of course, be made after the [EIS] has been . . . considered and discussed in the light of the alternatives, not before. Otherwise the process becomes a useless ritual, defeating the purpose of NEPA, and rather making a mockery of it." Natural Res. Def recently supported this assertion.139 However, the arbitrary or capricious standard of review applies to judicial review of an agency's stated purpose.140 Thus, notwithstanding these circuit court decisions, the majority of courts have found agencies' purpose and need statements to be reasonable. 141 If a reviewing court does not invalidate an EIS for having a purpose and need statement that is too narrow, it must then decide whether the agency's discussion of alternatives violates the "'rule of reason' which governs both 'which alternatives the agency must discuss' and 'the extent to which it must discuss them.'"142 The speciªc number of alternatives considered-whether discussed in detail or only brieºy-is not determinative; rather, an agency is charged with evaluating a "reasonable" number of alternatives for the particular situation.143 While courts have found to be reasonable agencies' choices to discuss varying numbers of alternatives,144 they have at times found unreasonable agencies' choices to discuss only a single alternative. 145 Another factor that makes it less likely for courts to rule in favor of plaintiffs is that agencies are not required to select the most environ- mentally preferable option as their favored alternative.146 Thus, once reasonable alternatives receive procedural consideration, an agency is free to select whichever alternative it desires based on criteria of its choosing.147 A recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision gives certain agencies additional leeway by holding that an agency primarily concerned with conserving and protecting the environment is subject to less stringent requirements when choosing a range of alternatives to consider.148
Acting as a judicial counterbalance, however, is the fact that courts will invalidate an EIS if the agency has neglected to fully analyze all of the reasonable alternatives.149 This requires a court hearing a challenge to an EIS to review both the reasonableness of an agency's choice to forego certain alternatives, and the reasonableness of the agency's level of review for its chosen alternatives. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's conclusion in a 1997 case emphasizes this point succinctly:
If NEPA mandates anything, it mandates this: a federal agency cannot ram through a project before ªrst weighing the pros and cons of the alternatives. In this case, the ofªcials of [ 
B. Inadequate Risk-Assessment Methodologies
Prior to 1986, CEQ regulations required agencies to conduct a worst-case analysis when completing an EIS.151 Then, in a move that had been forecast three years earlier,152 CEQ revoked the worst-case analysis requirement. 153 The new regulations required only analysis of "reasonably foreseeable" events and a statement of any "incomplete or unavailable" relevant information.154 In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the change, holding that requiring analysis of only "reasonably foreseeable" occurrences would focus public discussion on the issues of greatest relevance. 155 This change, coupled with a deferential standard of review, established a high bar for plaintiffs challenging agencies' decisions on whether, and how, to analyze certain environmental impacts.156 A onesided battle over scientiªc methodologies often results, with plaintiffs charging agencies with cherry-picking scientiªc studies to match their desired outcomes, and courts in turn deferring to those studies. 157 It may still be possible, however, to invalidate an EIS for failure to consider low-probability, high-risk environmental consequences of an agency action.158 As deªned in the regulations, "'reasonably foreseeable' includes impacts which have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the analysis of the impacts is supported by credible scientiªc evidence, is not based on pure conjecture, and is within the rule of reason."159 This language has led some observers to point out that courts may still be required to review the credibility of scientiªc opinions, if only to check for procedural compliance. 160 Despite the deferential standard of review and CEQ's revocation of the worst-case scenario requirement, courts do at times engage in this type of review.161 In a 1991 district court decision, the Department of Energy was required to fully examine the risks of transporting nuclear material:
The Department's decision is akin to saying that some things just cannot happen. Yet the Department cannot deny that such accidents are possible . . . . Further, although the Department discounts the possibility of human interventioneither through error or sabotage, the risks remain. It is particularly important that a government agency be completely forthright about the risks of a program involving radioactive materials, which inspire great fear among many members of the public.162
The court went on to note-perhaps sarcastically-that since the agency had already come up with a risk assessment methodology likely to show that its actions carried no risk, it had no reason to not apply its chosen method to each potential risk scenario.163
IV. Analysis: Courts Are Unlikely to Mandate a PEIS for Project BioShield
Potential environmental plaintiffs can look to both regulatory language and case law to support their assertion that a PEIS is necessary for Project BioShield.164 However, the commonsense objective of not wasting government resources would counsel against requiring a PEIS, since site-speciªc EISs have already been undertaken.165 When called upon to balance the plaintiffs' claims with the conservation of government resources, a court will likely ªnd that no PEIS is necessary for Project BioShield.166
A. Plaintiffs' Argument: A PEIS Is Necessary
As evidenced by the fact that NIH has already prepared a Draft EIS (DEIS) for the proposed BUMC BSL-3/4 laboratory,167 that the nine proposed Project BioShield facilities constitute "major Federal actions signiªcantly affecting the quality of the human environment" is not under debate.168 Courts will analyze regulatory language and case law to determine whether a PEIS is necessary. Here, both CEQ's guidelines and cases discussing the development of new technologies stand for the proposition that NIH should indeed conduct a PEIS.
Regulatory Language
Because NEPA does not directly mention PEISs reviewing courts will look to CEQ regulations for guidance, and will give "substantial deference" to CEQ's opinions. With this language in mind, plaintiffs must argue that Project BioShield has not passed this point. Additionally, a plaintiff would want to argue that NIH never even considered completing a PEIS, as the court required in Heckler.191 Lastly, a plaintiff would want to quote the language of Senior Circuit Judge MacKinnon's concurrence, and assure the court that the lawsuit was not brought with "delaying tactics" in mind.192
B. Agency's Argument: A PEIS Is Not Necessary
The deference that reviewing courts must give to agencies' decisions creates a signiªcant hurdle for plaintiffs to clear before their claim will be heard.193 Adding to the plaintiffs' challenge is the fact that agencies have an entrenched policy argument they can use to counter plaintiffs' claims that a PEIS is necessary for Project BioShield: government agencies should not waste resources by reevaluating information that has already been analyzed. 194 Presumably in good faith, NIH made the decision to not prepare a PEIS for Project BioShield. 195 Because of courts' deferential standard of review toward agencies' choices, NIH's decision alone might be enough for a court to refuse mandating a PEIS. 196 Tipping the scales even further in favor of the agency is the fact that work has already begun on the EISs in question. NIH's current position is similar to that of the Department of Transportation in Mooreforce, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Transportation, where site-speciªc EISs were complete at the time of litigation. 197 Similarly, two separate circuit court decisions have stated that a PEIS should only be prepared if it can be "forward-looking"-a quality that cannot exist when individual, site-speciªc EISs have already been prepared.198 Consequently, NIH can effectively argue that it should not have to prepare a PEIS, since imposing that requirement would "not accomplish the purpose of a PEIS," and would likely violate CEQ's directive to "avoid duplication and delay."199
C. Prediction
Because of the deference NIH will receive from the court, plaintiffs must fully meet their burden in order to persuade a judge to mandate a PEIS. Although the CEQ regulations contain language that plaintiffs can cite with respect to new technologies and tiering, the regulations also support NIH's assertion that a PEIS should not be completed because it would cause "duplication and delay."200 Although the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has made a point of adhering to the exact regulatory language when interpreting new technology cases, it stands alone.201 Meanwhile, Supreme Court decisions interpreting NEPA have been conspicuously sparse, and those that exist have overwhelmingly upheld agency actions.202 Consequently, environmental plaintiffs are unlikely to convince a reviewing court to require NIH to prepare a PEIS for Project BioShield.
V. Case Study Analysis: Courts May Invalidate the BUMC EIS
In analyzing the likelihood of plaintiffs' claim that the site-speciªc EIS is inadequate as ªled, each of the two issues detailed in Part III must be examined. Because NIH declined to prepare a PEIS, however, it is not possible to herein address the speciªcs of each individual EIS. As such, this Note analyzes these charges as they speciªcally apply to the EIS submitted by NIH for the BUMC site.203 The conclusions drawn may apply to other Project BioShield lawsuits, depending on the adequacy of the respective EISs. More important for the purposes of this Note, the potential inadequacy of the BUMC EIS raises signiªcant questions about the future role of PEISs in general.204
A. Consideration of Project Alternatives May Be Inadequate
A reviewing court could potentially invalidate the BUMC DEIS for any one of the following reasons: (1) an impermissibly narrow purpose and need statement; (2) failure to discuss in detail a reasonable number of alternatives; (3) failure to discuss in detail a reasonable alternative; and (4) disingenuous timing.
The BUMC DEIS's purpose and need statement reads in pertinent part: "The purpose of the Proposed Action is to fund the construction of the Boston-NBL at the BioSquare Research Park . . . . [ The facility] would be located on the BUMC campus in Boston, MA . . . ."205 Admittedly a "slippery concept," NIH's deªnition of "purpose" in this instance appears to be "so slender as to deªne competing reasonable alternatives out of consideration (and even out of existence)."206 It is difªcult to imagine a single alternative which would ªt this purpose besides NIH's own predetermined choice. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently noted, a reviewing court may conclude that "such a narrow deªnition of Project needs would violate NEPA."207 Secondly, the BUMC DEIS provides a detailed discussion of only a single action alternative in addition to the requisite no action alterna-tive,208 and brieºy discusses three additional alternatives that NIH deemed unreasonable.209 While there is no mandated number of alternatives that must be discussed in detail, the "rule of reason" suggests that this number should be more than one.210 Similarly, an agency's decision to only analyze a single option in detail appears disingenuous in light of NEPA's mandate to foster informed decisionmaking.211
Thirdly, the BUMC DEIS "considered and subsequently eliminated from further review" three alternatives which NIH determined "provided no environmental advantage over the Proposed Action or No Action or [did] not meet the purpose and need of the Project."212 Two of these alternatives-locating the NBL in lower-density areas outside Boston and locating the NBL at other Boston Universityowned sites-represent essentially the same view: a BSL-3/4 laboratory should not be built in a densely populated area. In declining to give these alternatives detailed analysis, NIH tautologously refers to beneªts already present at the BUMC campus. 213 The DEIS then summarily concludes the discussion by stating, "[f]inally, the alternative of a location outside Massachusetts or in a lower density area outside of Boston are not a feasible alternatives [sic] as they do not meet the purpose and need for the Project."214 A reviewing court could ªnd this circular argument unreasonable and, following the lead of a recent holding by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, invalidate the BUMC DEIS for failure to address reasonable alternatives. 215 Finally, and perhaps most poignantly, the DEIS states that "NIAID selected the BUMC . . . based on multiple factors including review of environmental issues, but focused primarily on the scientiªc and technical merit of the application . . . and on BUMC's ability to contribute to the overall NIAID biodefense research agenda."216 In another feat of circular logic, the "review of environmental issues" that NIH speciously claims to have conducted prior to its site selection can only be seen as disingenuous, since the NEPA-mandated alternatives review was initiated after the selection was made. As such, a reviewing court could in-deed ªnd that NIH did not fulªll its statutory obligation to consider project alternatives in its decisionmaking process.217 As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed three decades ago, "the critical agency decision must, of course, be made . . . in light of the alternatives, not before. Otherwise the process becomes a useless ritual, defeating the purpose of NEPA, and rather making a mockery of it." 218 Alternatively, a reviewing court may validate NIH's choices of alternatives if NIH effectively argues that the overall goal of Project BioShield is to conserve and protect the environment by creating vaccines for deadly diseases before terrorists have an opportunity to unleash them. Following the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's lead, a court could therefore decide that, given the "conservation and preventative goals" of the agency, NIH was not required to conduct in-depth analysis of certain alternatives.219 It is also to NIH's advantage that courts ªnd agencies' purpose and need statements valid three times as often as they invalidate them.220 Additionally, some lower courts have previously validated EISs discussing in detail only a single alternative.221
B. Risk-Assessment Methodologies May Be Inadequate
If a reviewing court does not invalidate the BUMC DEIS on the basis of inadequate consideration of project alternatives, it may still decide to invalidate it for using inadequate risk-assessment methodologies. First, NIH cites a study concluding that the proposed NBL presented a "negligible" risk to the public as a factor in determining that "locating the facility in a lower density area would not in any way reduce the risk to the public."222 Additionally, although CEQ regulations no longer require it, the BUMC DEIS discusses in detail what it claims to be a realistic worst-case scenario.223 Finally, the DEIS brieºy discusses-and then dismisses-ªve other potential risk scenarios as presenting "negligible" community risk.224
Not surprisingly, there has been a backlash from environmental groups over NIH's choice of scientiªc methodologies.225 While plaintiffs have an uphill battle in proving that the agency did not properly analyze all "reasonably foreseeable" occurrences, the regulations do leave room for courts to ªnd NIH's risk-assessment methodologies inadequate.226 It is possible that a reviewing court will see the BSL-3/4 laboratory materials as analogous to the spent nuclear fuel rods in Sierra Club v. Watkins-potentially dangerous offshoots of a nominally beneªcial public enterprise.227 In such an instance, the Watkins court's admonition that "[i]t is particularly important that a government agency be completely forthright about the risks of a program involving radioactive materials, which inspire great fear among many members of the public," would seem equally pertinent to the infectious disease materials in the present case.228 Thus, a reviewing court may indeed invalidate the BUMC DEIS for inadequate risk-assessment methodologies.
VI. The Project BioShield Prisoner's Dilemma
The set of circumstances predicted in Parts IV and V lead to a ªnite number of potential endgames for Project BioShield litigation, none of which is beneªcial to both the government and environmentalists.229 Because the current outlook is less than ideal, consideration of the different historical paths that could have been taken leads to hy-224 BUMC DEIS, supra note 4, at 4-11 to 4-15. The ªve scenarios are as follows: (1) a laboratory-acquired infection; (2) escape of an infected animal; (3) release of infectious materials during transportation; (4) unauthorized removal of biological material; and (5) a terrorist-related bombing. Id.
225 See December ACE Letter, supra note 17, at 5. This letter sets out several perceived deªciencies in NIH's analysis, including the use of a BSL-3 pathogen-anthrax-instead of a BSL-4 pathogen-such as Ebola-in its models; use of the wrong number of anthrax spores per gram; failure to consider the increased susceptibility of some people; failure to consider spore dispersal in an urban environment; failure to consider a release of numerous biological pathogens; failure to address soil contamination; failure to consider the escape of an infected insect or animal; failure to analyze a release during transit; and failure to include a threat and vulnerability analysis for a terrorist attack on the laboratory. Assuming the above analyses hold true, a PEIS will not be mandated and the site-speciªc EIS may or may not be invalidated.232 Thus, there appears to be three viable endgames to Project BioShield litigation: (1) the EIS is validated and the NBL is built; (2) the EIS is invalidated and NIH chooses to build elsewhere; and (3) the EIS is invalidated but NIH chooses to pursue building at the BUMC site by ªling a supplemental EIS that is later accepted.233
Each of these outcomes is unattractive to at least one of the participants. In the ªrst option, environmentalists lose because the NBL is built in a densely populated area. In the second option, the government loses because it has wasted time and money on an unsuccessful project. In the third option, environmentalists lose because the lab is built in a densely populated area and the government loses because it wasted time and money in having to prepare a supplemental EIS.
In the absence of a mutually beneªcial option, both government agencies and environmental groups willingly roll the dice-however weighted they may be-with courts that have been historically hostile to NEPA.234 In light of the unavoidable loss of time and money involved, this present situation is less than ideal.
B. The Past: The Optimal Prisoner's Dilemma Outcome Was Realistically Unattainable
Although the current endgames mentioned above are immutable owing to previous decisions made or foregone, examining where alternate paths could have led engenders consideration of disparate viewpoints and lends a sense of urgency to proposals for the future. 232 See discussion supra Parts IV, V. 233 Though theoretically conceivable, two additional outcomes-the EIS is invalidated but NIH builds anyway, and the EIS is validated but NIH does not build-are realistically unattainable.
234 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
Applying the Prisoner's Dilemma to Project BioShield
The predicament faced by the government and environmentalists at Project BioShield's inception can be likened to a well-known nonzero-sum235 game theory concept: the prisoner's dilemma.236 This models decisions made by two opposing parties, where each party, acting in self-interest, will attempt to maximize its own payout despite the fact that both parties would be better off if they cooperated.237
Speciªcally, the post-9/11 government perceived an imminent terrorist threat, and may have thought it reasonable to try to force through environmental review its ªrst choice for a BSL-3/4 laboratory.238 On the other hand, the prospect of a potential legal victory encouraged environmental plaintiffs to ªle lawsuits and stall proceedings at every juncture, regardless of the relative reasonableness of the government's proposed actions. Given the circumstances as they existed at the time, the government's and the potential plaintiffs' decisions alike were both rational.239
As in the classic prisoner's dilemma problem, there are four potential outcomes: (1) NIH does not complete a PEIS and environmental groups sue; (2) NIH does not complete a PEIS but environmental groups decide not to sue; (3) NIH completes a PEIS but You may choose to confess or remain silent. If you confess and your accomplice remains silent I will drop all charges against you and use your testimony to ensure that your accomplice does serious time. Likewise, if your accomplice confesses while you remain silent, they will go free while you do the time. If you both confess I get two convictions, but I'll see to it that you both get early parole. If you both remain silent, I'll have to settle for token sentences on ªrearms possession charges.
Id.
237 See id. Couched in terms of the classic prisoner scenario, it is seen that "whatever the other [prisoner] does, each is better off confessing than remaining silent. But the outcome obtained when both confess is worse for each than the outcome they would have obtained had both remained silent." Id. Although this last outcome-NIH completes a PEIS and environmental groups do not sue-appears to be a mutually advantageous solution, does prisoner's dilemma analysis conªrm it as the optimal outcome?241 A situation where both the government and environmentalists receive what they want with relatively low costs and few delays would beneªt both sides. For NIH, this entails the permitting and construction of an NBL with minimal legal delays, while the environment is better off if NIH initially proposes an NBL sited in a less densely populated area.242 Had NIH chosen to prepare a thorough PEIS-one that was tiered and included candid risk assessment and alternatives analyses-the optimal outcome may have been reached.243
The ªrst tier of a thorough PEIS would include a genuine analysis of the inherent risks posed when working closely with organisms such as Ebola and diseases such as SARS. With the statutory goal of informed environmental decisionmaking in mind, such an analysis would realistically analyze the probabilities of a wide variety of accident scenarios, rather than summarily concluding that a few relatively benign scenarios would have "negligible" impacts. 244 Had it conducted this sincere risk assessment, NIH would have approached the second phase of the tiering process-alternatives analysis and site selection-fully informed of the unlikely, but devastating, effects of an accidental release. Armed with this knowledge, 240 Looking at the situation as it currently presents itself, it is almost certain that the ªrst potential outcome will come to pass because NIH has already chosen not to complete a PEIS and environmental groups have given every indication that they will attempt to block proposed BSL-3/4 laboratories with litigation. See discussion supra Part IV.
241 Rating certain outcomes as better than others-thus recognizing the existence of an optimal outcome-is essential for non-zero-sum game theory analysis. See generally ZeroSum, supra note 235.
242 Not all environmentalists would necessarily be pleased, however. Some critics claim that researching these dangerous diseases is never a good idea, regardless of where the research is conducted. This set of events perfectly mirrors the optimal outcome of the classic prisoner's dilemma247-if one additional assumption is made. In this optimal scenario, the government makes a cooperative concession to environmentalists by taking the time and money to effectively analyze the situation. One must then assume that this compromise results in a cooperative concession from environmentalists-recognition of NIH's comprehensive analyses, and their subsequent decision not to litigate the agency's informed selection of the less densely populated location as its preferred alternative. Thus, the Project BioShield prisoner's dilemma demonstrates that the true optimal outcome would only have been attainable if both sides had cooperated effectively and conceded accordingly.
The Optimal Outcome Was-and Is-Realistically Unattainable
Faced with the practical certainty of legal action regardless of the perceived diligence of their selection processes, agencies have every incentive to spend less time and money on their environmental analyses and attempt to force through their ªrst choice without a PEIS. Environmentalists have reacted in turn by further marginalizing their role with ever-more-radical attempts to be heard. 248 With no incentive to arrive at a mutually beneªcial outcome, neither the government nor environmentalists have reason to stray from their self-serving paths; thus, the sub-optimal status quo persists.
C. The Future: Congress, CEQ, and the Courts Should Strive for the Best Possible Outcome
Recognizing that the optimal outcome exists but is realistically unattainable, a mechanism should be adopted that pushes both agencies and environmental plaintiffs towards the best possible outcome. Currently, neither NEPA nor the CEQ regulations clearly mandate the use of PEISs,249 and courts are loathe to impose such a requirement.250 In this instance, however, the situation resulting from NIH's initial preparation of a thorough PEIS, coupled with the concomitant decrease in both the number and viability of impending environmental lawsuits, a thorough PEIS would have been as close to the optimal outcome as possible. Going forward, the current sub-optimal status quo need not be tacitly condoned by the absence of statutory, regulatory, and judicial guidance forcing the completion of thorough PEISs.
VII. Recommendations for Modernizing PEISs
In Kleppe v. Sierra Club, the U.S. Supreme Court did not stop at merely legitimizing PEISs of national scope; it went further in recognizing that PEISs were actually required in some instances.251 However, a problem arises where, as in the current situation, despite the fact that prior completion of a PEIS would have been advantageous, an agency is able to forego such an action by pressing ahead with sitespeciªc EISs.252 Continued acceptance of this frequent practice realistically means that PEISs can always be avoided. For PEISs to reach their potential as planning tools, Congress, CEQ, and the courts must modernize them by clarifying the vague aspects of the PEIS process.
A. Congress Should Amend NEPA
Congress should amend NEPA to legislatively recognize PEISs, state exactly when they should be implemented, and establish the exact levels of analysis necessary for their validation.253 Unfortunately, Congress has shown little desire to amend NEPA since its inception, and recent amendments have only diminished the statute's environ- 256 Chapter 3 of this report focuses speciªcally on tiering and PEISs, stating that they are "valuable decisionmaking tools" that agencies do not take advantage of often enough. 257 Indeed, James L. Connaughton, the chairman and sole member of CEQ, recognized the importance of PEIS modernization in an address he gave a few months before the report was published. 258 In an article adapted from his address, Connaughton stated that "we are on the cusp of a new future for this whole idea of environmental review," and posed an important question about the future of PEISs speciªcally: "The question we must ªnd an answer to now is how to pull environmental and risk assessments together in such a way to create a more programmatic view of planning and development . . . . "259 Perhaps in a nod to CEQ's poor reputation among environmental groups,260 the NEPA Task Force report proposed that the onus of answering the chairman's question be delegated to a diverse Federal Advisory Committee in order to "foster a nonfederal perspective and encourage public trust."261 This committee would be charged with proposing regulations to "clearly deªne" both the range of alternatives and the depth of analysis required in NEPA documents.262 Importantly, the report also recognizes that early involvement of all concerned parties is essential to a properly prepared PEIS.263
These recommendations are clearly relevant and should be adopted by CEQ. What the report fails to mention, however, is the need for regulations that state exactly when a PEIS must be pursued for each speciªc type of project. This would clarify the Kleppe Court's holding that PEISs are sometimes mandatory.264 Additionally, it would usher the two relevant parties toward the best possible prisoner's dilemma outcome: agencies would complete a PEIS only when required, and environmentalists would not sue every time an agency declined to complete a PEIS.265 Agencies must know exactly when to begin the PEIS analysis; without this impetus, the NEPA Task Force's compelling recommendations on how to thoroughly complete a PEIS may never be implemented.
Any meaningful CEQ overhaul of the PEIS regulations would therefore require all three of these innovations. Chronologically, an agency must ªrst know whether completion of a PEIS is required for the speciªc action in question. If so, then the agency involved must be required to begin the PEIS process right away by requesting input from a wide range of affected parties at the outset. Finally, once those discussions have begun, the agency must know exactly what levels of analysis the PEIS must contain-both in terms of ranges of alternatives and risk-assessment methodologies.
C. The Courts Should Encourage Agencies to Consider PEISs
Early on in the environmental review process, courts should be vigilant in demanding that agencies have valid reasons for deciding to forego PEISs. Although the deferential standard of review will continue to constrain courts from mandating PEISs in many circum- stances,266 the subjective nature of this test allows courts to censure those agencies that refuse outright to consider PEISs, as well as those that arbitrarily decline their use. Timely enforcement of these requirements will assure that an agency cannot preempt the informed use of a PEIS by beginning site-speciªc EISs before a court has had the chance to appraise the situation.
As with Project BioShield, however, judicial review is not always initiated before work on site-speciªc EISs has commenced. Nonetheless, well-reasoned court rulings on the validity of EISs may prospectively inºuence agencies' consideration of PEISs as planning tools. If hastily conceived EISs were routinely invalidated-either for failure to adequately consider project alternatives or for inadequate riskassessment methodologies-then initial, project-level environmental evaluations are more likely to be implemented. Because this "informed" decisionmaking would result in more thorough site-selection procedures, less time and money would be spent by agencies on court proceedings. In sum, effective judicial enforcement of EIS requirements would eventually cause agencies to recognize PEISs as valuable planning tools.
D. A Necessary First Step
All things considered, the executive branch is in the best position to make effective changes to the ways its agencies approach PEISs, for agencies are less likely to question instructions if they come from CEQ. Additionally, while there currently exists a vast body of NEPA common law, the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to reduce the burdens of environmental litigation by broadcasting its preference that CEQ's regulations be given substantial deference.
It is possible, of course, that CEQ is content with the status quo.267 In that case, the courts should use Project BioShield litigation as a starting point for taking a stand on agencies' PEIS reluctance. By invalidating the BUMC EIS for either inadequate consideration of alternatives or inadequate risk-assessment methodologies, the courts can take a necessary ªrst step toward change.
Conclusion
In light of public apprehension regarding the inherent dangers posed by BSL-3/4 pathogens, litigation is likely to result from siting controversies over proposed Project BioShield laboratories. Given professed executive and legislative approval for the swift proliferation of vaccine-producing laboratory space, environmental opposition should focus on the need for these laboratories to be sited in areas with comparatively low population densities, rather than on the desire to halt all construction indeªnitely.
Though regulatory language and a line of appellate court cases support their assertions, environmental plaintiffs nationwide are unlikely to prevail in their claims that NIH failed to complete a PEIS, because courts will probably defer to NIH's desire not to waste agency resources. On the other hand, a reviewing court may invalidate NIH's site-speciªc BUMC EIS-and any signiªcantly comparable EISs-for either failure to adequately consider project alternatives or use of inadequate riskassessment methodologies.
Unfortunately, the current range of potential litigation endgames does not include an option that is mutually beneªcial to agency and environmentalist alike. In an effort to effectuate such an outcome going forward, future actors must ªrst scrutinize the historical underpinnings supporting the present stalemate. Applying the prisoner's dilemma game theory model to the circumstances present at the inception of Project BioShield shows that, although an optimal outcome existed, it was realistically unattainable.
Looking ahead, Congress, CEQ, and the courts should strive to make the best possible outcome-initial agency completion of a thorough PEIS, coupled with the attendant decrease in both the number and efªcacy of potential environmental lawsuits-a reality for similarly situated agencies. Unfortunately, legislation clarifying NEPA processes is unlikely to materialize any time soon. As a result, CEQ is in the best position to make effective changes to the PEIS process through the promulgation of clarifying regulations. Such regulations should: (1) detail the types and amounts of analysis necessary for a given category of PEISs; (2) require early communication between all affected parties in PEIS proceedings; and (3) state exactly when a PEIS must be pursued in the ªrst place. Although cataloging the necessary changes to agencies' PEIS practices will no doubt be a Herculean task for CEQ, its one-time occurrence is certainly preferable to the Sisyphean process undertaken by agencies attempting to navigate the current regulatory morass.
